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This paper examines the effect of China’s rapid economic 
development on the Korean economy through trade and investment 
linkages.  It shows that China’s export structure has converged to that 
of Korea with its exports displacing Korean exports in third-country 
markets while the bilateral trade between the two countries has 
expanded rapidly.  The paper points out that the displacement of 
Korean exports by exports from China is partly due to exports from 
Korean affiliates in China.  It concludes with ideas on how Korea will 
have to respond to China’s rapid industrialization to sustain its own 
economic growth.      
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Economic relations between the Republic of Korea (henceforth Korea) and 
the People’s Republic of China (henceforth China) have been expanding ever 
since China undertook the Four Modernization reforms in the late 1970s and 
the two countries established a formal diplomatic relationship in 1987.  
Bilateral trade between the two has been growing steadily in both the volume 
and the variety of goods traded.  Capital flows between the two likewise 
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have been increasing although the flows have been mostly from Korea to 
China in the form of direct investment.  Between 1989 and 2001, for 
instance, Korea’s merchandise exports to China grew from $1.3 billion to 
$18.2 billion while China’s merchandise exports to Korea grew from $472 
million to $12.5 billion (UNCOMTRADE).  In fact, China has now 
emerged as Korea’s third largest trading partner.  Also, by the end of 2002 
Korea had invested $5.6 billion in China where it had no investment at all 
before the late 1970s, and during 2002 alone Korea invested $777 million in 
China (Lee and Kim, 2004, Table 3).  This increasing trend in both trade 
and investment is a sign that the economic growth of the post-reform China 
has had a beneficial effect on the Korean economy.  Its effect, however, has 
not been entirely positive. 
The rapid industrialization of the Chinese economy has had both positive 
and negative effects on the Korean economy, as it has created markets for 
Korean products in China while leading to their displacement in third-
country markets.  As a matter of fact, an influential report undertaken in 
Korea on the future of its economy has portrayed the present condition of the 
Korean economy a “nutcracker” situation as it is rapidly losing its 
comparative advantage in many of its manufacturing industries to China 
while it has yet to gain a comparative advantage in technologically more 
advanced industries (Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 1997).  Obviously, this 
nutcracker situation will be only temporary and short-lived if Korea succeeds 
in gaining a comparative advantage in technologically more advanced 
industries that will sustain its economic growth.  Otherwise it will persist 
long with adverse consequences on the Korean economy.1) 
In this paper we examine the changes that have taken place in the export 
structure of China and Korea and their implications for their bilateral trade 
                                            
1) The situation in which Korea now finds itself with respect to China parallels that in which 
Japan was before the 1940s. According to Howe (1996), Akamatsu Kaname characterized 
the Japanese economy as being challenged by the “newly industrializing economy” of 
China but lagging behind the West. Akamatsu saw Japan’s situation as a transitional phase 
that required both the domestic and international processes of adjustment but was made 
difficult by the West with its entrenched trading postion in East Asia.   
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relationship.  In section 2 we specifically examine the trends and 
characteristics of the two countries’ overall export structure for 1986-2001 to 
find out the extent to which China’s export structure has “caught up” with 
that of Korea.  It will be shown that exports from China have in fact 
displaced many of the Korean exports in Japan and the United States, 
Korea’s two major trading partners.  In section 3 we investigate the trends 
and characteristics of the China-Korea bilateral trade.  We show that the 
bilateral trade has increased more rapidly than their respective trade with the 
rest of the world and that there is an increasing trend in intra-industry trade 
between the two countries.  Section 4 examines the linkage between Korean 
investment in China and the bilateral trade between the two.  In the final 
section we offer some ideas on how Korea will have to respond to the 
challenges brought about by China’s rapid economic growth. 
 
2. CHANGING EXPORT STRUCTURE OF CHINA 
AND KOREA 
 
To find an overall picture of changes in the export structure of China and 
Korea we first examine the sectoral distribution of their exports at the SITC 
1-digit level, using the United Nations trade statistics (UNCOMTRADE).  
We find that in 1986-2001 China, and Korea to a lesser extent, went through 
a major change in their export structure (Table 1). 
In 1986, manufactured goods (SITC-6), mineral fuels (SITC-3), food and 
live animals (SITC-0), and crude material (SITC-2) accounted for close to 90 
percent of China’s exports, indicating that China’s comparative advantage 
was then mainly in simple manufactured goods and raw materials.  By 2001, 
however, China made a significant change in its export structure with 
machinery and transport equipment (SITC-7), miscellaneous manufactured 
articles (SITC-8), and manufactured goods (SITC-6) together accounting for 
85 percent of its total exports.  The first two sectors increased their export 
share from 1.77 and 4.22 percent in 1986 to 35.65 and 32.54 percent in 2001, 
respectively—a clear sign that China was becoming rapidly industrialized, 
making a significant change in its export structure in only 15 years.  What is  
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Table 1  Sectoral Distribution of Total Exports 
(share in total exports) 
(unit: %) 
China Korea  
1986 1991 1996 2001 1986 1991 1996 2001 
SITC0 Food and Live Anim-als 19.16 10.28 6.76 4.80 4.52 2.98 2.09 1.47 
SITC1 Bevera-ges and Tobacco 0.26 0.74 0.89 0.33 0.28 0.16 0.16 0.20 
SITC2 Crude Material 16.63 4.84 2.66 1.55 0.97 1.37 1.24 1.05 
SITC3 Mineral Fuels, etc 24.45 6.62 3.93 3.16 1.87 2.10 3.00 5.34 
SITC4 Animal Vegetable Oils etc. 0.70 0.21 0.25 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 
SITC5 Chemi-cals and 
RelatedProducts 
4.36 5.36 5.85 4.97 3.08 4.39 6.98 8.22 
SITC6 Manufctured goods 28.45 20.51 19.33 16.73 23.59 22.76 21.14 18.11 
SITC7 MachineryandTransport 
Equipment 
1.77 19.36 23.35 35.65 33.58 41.70 52.08 57.43 
SITC8 Miscellaneous 
Manufactured Articles 
4.22 31.06 36.84 32.54 31.97 24.17 9.17 7.44 
SITC9 not classified . 1.03 0.15 0.22 0.14 0.36 4.13 0.74 
Source: UN COMTRADE data. 
 
noteworthy is that the most dramatic change in the export structure took 
place during the five-year period of 1986-1991. 
Korea has also experienced changes in its export structure, albeit not as 
drastic as in China.  In 1986, three manufacturing sectors—SITC-7, SITC-8, 
and SITC-6—together accounted for 89.14 percent of Korea’s exports, a sign 
that by 1986 Korea had become a highly industrialized economy.  By 2001, 
the share of exports of the last two sectors dropped significantly to 7.44 and 
18.11 percent from 31.97 and 23.59 percent in 1986, respectively, while the 
share of SITC-7 increased from 33.58 to 57.43 percent.  These are signs that 
Korea’s comparative advantage has been shifting from low-wage, labor-
intensive to capital-intensive and technology-intensive manufacturing 
industries. 
The above analysis of changes in the export structure, which is based on 
the one-digit SITC sector classification, provides us with a rough measure of 
change in comparative advantage that has taken place in China and Korea but 
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says little on what might have brought about the change.  Is it a change in 
factor endowment or an improvement in technology that has brought about 
the change? The data based on the one-digit SITC classification are too 
aggregate to provide an answer to this question.  The SITC-8 sector 
(miscellaneous manufactured articles), for instance, includes labor-intensive, 
low technology products such as apparel, footwear, and toys as well as high 
technology products such as photographic apparatus, medical instruments.  
The SITC-6 sector (manufactured goods) also covers a diverse set of 
products that range from labor-intensive textile fabric to resource-based 
rubber and aluminum and capital-intensive tube and pipes.   
To help us find an answer to the question of what has brought about the 
change in the export structure we group products in terms of production 
technology.  That is, following Lall (2000) we divide the products classified 
at the 3-digit SITC level into ten subgroups divided in terms of the level of 
production technology.  This is done in two steps: the products are first 
divided into five groups—primary products (PP), resource-based products 
(RB), low-technology products (LT), medium-technology products (MT), 
and high technology products (HT); and the latter four are divided further 
into agriculture-based products (RB1), other resource-based products (RB2), 
textile/fashion cluster (LT1), other low technology products (LT2), 
automotive products (MT1), process industries—chemical and basic 
metals—(MT2), engineering products (MT3), electronics and electrical 
products (HT1), and other high-technology products (HT2).   
It is clear from Table 2 that changes in China’s export structure are highly 
correlated with its increasing ability to produce technologically more 
sophisticated products.  In 1986 a little more than a half of China’s exports 
was in primary products such as crude petroleum, gas, vegetables, and rice, 
with low technology products and technologically more sophisticated 
products accounting for 25 and approximately 10 percent, respectively.  But 
by 2001, China made a dramatic change in its export structure, achieving a  
remarkable increase in the export of medium and high technology products, 
especially in the export of engineering product (MT3) and electronics (HT1).   
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Table 2  Distribution of Total Exports by Technological Category 
(share in total exports) 
                                                                                       (unit: %) 
 PP RB1 RB2 LT1 LT2 MT1 MT2 MT3 HT1 HT2 
China           
1986 50.93 5.78 8.05 20.99 4.35 0.39 5.26 1.55 0.39 2.30 
1991 18.11 4.44 5.82 31.35 11.42 6.74 5.08 10.13 4.09 1.64 
1996 9.99 5.24 5.59 30.18 15.52 0.94 5.94 11.17 12.59 2.34 
2001 6.92 3.86 5.03 24.71 14.96 1.55 5.06 13.22 21.84 2.15 
Korea           
1986 4.38 3.90 3.88 28.45 14.76 4.47 9.90 14.60 13.72 1.56 
1991 3.21 3.19 4.24 22.82 11.57 3.67 12.39 16.77 20.25 1.26 
1996 2.38 3.45 5.41 10.76 8.22 8.98 12.58 16.09 26.70 1.08 
2001 2.27 3.19 8.18 9.22 7.44 10.17 9.87 17.60 30.04 1.04 
Source: UN COMTRADE data. 
 
Their combined share of exports increased from less than two percent in 
1986 to more than 35 percent in 2001. 
China also increased exports from low-technology industries (LT1 and 
LT2) during the same period, albeit not as much as those from 
technologically more sophisticated industries, expanding their share of 
exports from 25 percent in 1986 to a little over 39 percent in 2001.  These 
industries, which require relatively simple skills and compete mostly on price, 
have served as an engine of China’s export growth during the 1986-2001 
period, taking advantage of China’s abundant supply of low-cost labor.   
As noted above, China has rapidly increased its export of electronics and 
other electrical products.  Although they are classified as high-technology 
products, the nature of technology associated with their production in China 
is quite varied.  While some of them require advanced technology and 
extensive R&D, others involve only simple labor-intensive processes.  
Furthermore, many of these products are only assembled at the foreign-
owned or joint venture enterprises that are in China mainly to take advantage 
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of its low-cost labor (Fung and Iizaka, 2002).  At present China may be able 
to export these products only with the help of foreign investors, but that does 
not mean that it will remain so for long.  Given that foreign direct 
investment has enabled rapid catching-up industrialization in other parts of 
Asia (Yamazawa, 1990), there is no reason why China will not be able to do 
the same and replicate the catch-up development achieved by Japan and the 
Asian NIEs.   
In the case of Korea the most dramatic increase took place in the export 
share of electronics and electrical products (HT1), albeit not as much as in 
China.  But unlike in the case of China this increase is from Korea’s 
indigenous firms, an indication that they have acquired their own capability 
for producing high technology products.  Also, as to be expected, the export 
share of textile (LT1) and other labor-intensive products (LT2) decreased 
from a combined share of 43 percent to a little over 16 percent.   
To further buttress the findings reported above we calculate the revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA) for China and Korea.  With the usual caveat 
we take an increasing value of a country’s RCA in a product as an indication 
that it is gaining a comparative advantage in that product, and conversely 
when the RCA is decreasing. 
It is clear, as shown in Table 3, that between 1986 and 2001 China rapidly 
shed its comparative advantage in primary products (PP) while maintaining 
its comparative advantage in textiles (LT1) and gaining one in other labor-
intensive products, a sign of a diversifying export structure.  The increase of 
RCA in engineering products and electronics is also impressive.  Although 
China did not have a comparative advantage in engineering products (MT3), 
as indicated by the value of RCA less than one, and although it gained a 
comparative advantage in electronics and electrical products (HT1) only in 
2001, the direction of change is clear: it is rapidly gaining a comparative 
advantage in these products. 
A comparison of changes in RCA for China and Korea suggests two points.  
One is that in terms of comparative advantage Korea is ahead of China in 
MT2, MT3 and HT1—a sign that in terms of manufacturing technology  
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Table 3  Revealed Comparative Advantage by Technological Categories 
 
 
PP RB1 RB2 LT1 LT2 MT1 MT2 MT3 HT1 HT2 
China           
1986 3.28 0.72 0.84 3.04 0.51 0.04 0.59 0.10 0.04 0.46 
1991 1.28 0.57 0.73 4.21 1.27 0.77 0.67 0.62 0.36 0.28 
1996 0.77 0.67 0.75 4.13 1.75 0.11 0.77 0.72 0.85 0.50 
2001 0.57 0.59 0.68 3.81 1.75 0.17 0.72 0.86 1.28 0.34 
Korea           
1986 0.28 0.49 0.40 4.13 1.73 0.47 1.11 0.92 1.48 0.31 
1991 0.23 0.41 0.54 3.06 1.29 0.42 1.62 1.03 1.77 0.22 
1996 0.18 0.44 0.72 1.47 0.93 1.05 1.64 1.03 1.80 0.23 
2001 0.19 0.49 1.10 1.42 0.87 1.13 1.40 1.15 1.77 0.16 
Source: Computation based on UN COMTRADE data. 
 
Korea is ahead of China.  The other point is that China’s gain in 
comparative advantage in LT2 appears exactly matched by Korea’s loss in 
the same.  This plus the fact that China had a strong comparative advantage 
in LT1 while Korea was losing its comparative advantage in the same clearly 
indicate that China is following Korea in the “catching-up product cycle” 
development (Akamatsu, 1962; Yamazawa, 1990). 
With China catching up with Korea one would expect export competition 
to increase between the two with the exports from the former replacing those 
from the latter in many of the world markets.  Our investigation of changes 
in the two countries’ market shares in Japan and the United States confirm 
this expectation.  In Table 4 we present Japan’s ten major imports (as of 
2001) from China for a select number of years between 1987 and 2001.  In 
these product groups, with the exception of SITC 77, 89, and 75, China made 
a significant increase in the market share at the expense of Korea.  This 
apparent displacement in Japan of Korean imports by Chinese imports took 
place mostly in labor-intensive low-technology and raw material industries— 
the industries in which Korea no longer holds a strong comparative 
advantage.  This displacement, however, is not limited to those industries: 
even in the market for Telecommunication and Sound Recording Products  
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Table 4  China’s and Korea’s Market Share in Japanese Imports 
 
China’s Share of 
Japan’s Imports (%) 
Korea’s Share of 
Japan’s Imports (%) 
Japan’s 10 Major Imports 
from China in 2001 
(SITC 2 digit level) 1987 1991 1996 2001 1987 1991 1996 2001 
84. Articles of apparel and 
clothing accessories 
17.8 34.5 59.3 77.0 37.7 24.9 6.9 3.6 
77. Electric machinery, 
apparatus and 
appliances, nes, and 
parts, nes 
0.4 3.1 9.1 16.5 10.9 10.0 12.7 10.5 
89. Miscellaneous 
manufactured articles, 
nes 
3.7 7.5 19.3 31.7 7.9 7.5 5.8 5.1 
76. Telecommunications, 
sound recording and 
reproducing equipment 
1.5 5.9 15.6 28.8 27.4 20.0 7.1 7.5 
75. Office machines and 
automatic data 
processing equipment 
0.23 1.0 7.0 15.8 3.7 3.0 2.7 7.6 
65. Textile yarn, fabrics, 
made-up articles, nes, 
and related products 
24.8 22.7 33.1 46.3 12.4 12.9 9.1 6.2 
03. Fish, Crustacean and 
Molluscs 
5.3 7.5 12.7 16.7 14.0 9.2 6.7 6.5 
05. Vegetables and Fruits 14.0 17.6 28.3 34.5 8.3 5.0 3.4 4.3 
85. Footwear 6.1 18.4 49.9 66.1 39.0 30.1 11.8 4.1 
82. Furniture and Parts 7.4 6.0 19.6 34.5 10.4 7.8 2.5 1.5 
Source: Computation based on UN COMTRADE data. 
 
(SITC 76) China increased its market share by 27 percentage points between 
1987 and 2001 while Korea lost its market share by about 20 percentage 
points. 
In Table 5 we present the ten major imports of the United States from 
China (as of 2001), another major trading partner for both China and Korea, 
for the same period.  These are product groups in which China made a 
significant gain in the market share in the United States and, again as in the  
case of Japan, China’s gain appears to have been at the expense of Korea 
with the exception of SITC 75, 76, and 77.  The displacement in the United 
States of Korean imports by Chinese imports took place, as to be expected, in 
labor-intensive low-technology industries.  What is, however, interesting  
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Table 5  China’s and Korea’s Market Share in United States Imports 
 
China’s Share of 
U.S.’s Imports (%) 
Korea’s Share of 
U.S.’s Imports (%) 
United States’ 10 Major 
Import from China in 2001 
(SITC 2 digit level) 1987 1991 1996 2001 1987 1991 1996 2001 
89. Miscellaneous 
manufactured articles, 
nes 
6.4 17.3 31.4 35.6 8.7 5.9 2.9 2.1 
75. Office machines and 
automatic data 
processing equipment 
0.04 1.0 5.4 14.4 4.3 4.3 5.9 6.1 
76.Telecommunications, 
sound recording and 
reproducing equipment 
1.2 6.5 13.5 16.4 10.0 7.5 3.4 9.6 
77. Electric machinery, 
apparatus and 
appliances, nes, and 
parts, nes 
0.6 2.9 5.8 11.7 6.9 6.8 9.6 5.9 
85. Footwear 2.0 27.6 51.6 64.9 24.1 21.3 2.7 0.7 
84. Articles of apparel and 
clothing accessories 
9.9 14.7 15.3 14.0 14.8 10.7 3.7 3.7 
82. Furniture and Parts 1.6 4.7 12.3 28.6 1.7 1.0 0.5 0.4 
69. Manufactures of Metal, 
nes 
1.9 5.6 9.9 20.1 7.9 5.8 3.8 3.5 
81. Sanitary, Plumbing, 
Heating, Lighting 
Fixtures and Fittings, 
nes 
0.8 13.3 42.1 53.3 4.4 3.1 1.3 0.6 
66. Non-Metallic Mineral 
Manufactures, nes 
1.2 2.5 6.6 10.1 1.8 1.1 0.3 0.6 
Source: Computation based on UN COMTRADE data. 
 
(and also puzzling) is that unlike in Japan Korea does not appear to have lost 
its market share to China in SITC 76 (Telecommunication and Sound 
Recording Products), keeping its market share steady at about 10 percent. 
 
3. CHINA-KOREA BILATERAL TRADE: TRENDS AND  
CHARACTERISTICS 
 
While Korea has been losing its market share to China in third-country 
markets the bilateral trade between the two has been increasing.  Although 
this increase is to be expected as concomitant to China’s expanding 
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international trade, we ask here whether economic development in China has 
had more than the “average” effect on the China-Korea bilateral trade.  To 
answer the question, that is, whether the increase in the China-Korea bilateral 
trade was greater than the average—the growth of their respective trade with 
the rest of the world—we calculate the export- and import- intensity indices 
for China and Korea, respectively.2) These indices are calculated for 1987 and 
2001 and are reported in the parenthesis on Tables 6 and 7.   In 1987 
China’s export-intensity index with respect to Korea was less than one, 
indicating that China exported a smaller share of its exports to Korea than its 
average for the rest of the world.  But in 2001 China’s export-intensity 
index with respect to Korea increased significantly.  China’s import-
intensity index with respect to Korea moved in a manner similar to its export-
intensity index.  Korea’s export-intensity with respect to China increased 
from zero to 2.77 over the period while its import-intensity index moved in a 
similar direction.  These increases in export- and import-intensity indices 
indicate that bilateral trade between the two countries has expanded faster 
than their respective trade with the rest of the world.   
When two economies become similar to each other in terms of factor 
endowment and technology there is a tendency for intra-industry trade 
between them to expand relative to their inter-industry trade.  With China 
converging to Korea in the export structure we would thus expect intra-
industry trade between the two to expand over time. 
To find out whether there was in fact such an expansion of intra-industry 
trade between China and Korea we calculate the intra-industry trade index—
one minus the ratio of the absolute value of exports minus imports over  
                                            
2) The export-intensity index is calculated as the share of country j in the total exports of 
country i normalized by country j’s share in the total world imports (excluding country i). If 
the index is greater than one, country j’s share of country i’s total exports is greater than its 
share of total world imports (excluding country i), indicating that country i is more 
dependent on country j for its exports than the average for the rest of the world, and 
conversely if it is less than one. The import-intensity index is calculated as country j’s share 
of the total imports of country i normalized by its share of total world exports (excluding 
country i). Thus if this index is greater than one, country j’s share of country i’s total 
imports is greater than its share of total world exports (excluding country i), indicating that 
country i is more dependent on country j for its imports than the average for the rest of the 
world is, and conversely if it is less than one. 
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Table 6  Destination of Exports as Percentage of Total Exports 
(export intensity) 
(unit: %) 
Destination 
Chinese 
Export 
Japan Korea HK ASEAN 
Other 
Asia USA 
Other 
America Europe Africa Oceania 
1987 16.21 0.01 34.93 6.06 5.43 7.66 2.26 15.17 1.46 0.91 
 (2.87) (0.00) (19.07) (2.06) (1.61) (0.48) (0.38) (0.25) (1.11) (0.67) 
2001 16.89 4.70 17.49 6.91 7.16 20.43 4.33 18.33 1.82 1.53 
 (2.65) (1.83) (4.74) (1.21) (1.60) (0.95) (0.60) (0.40) (2.81) (1.12) 
Korean 
Export 
China Japan HK ASEAN 
Other 
Asia 
USA 
Other 
America 
Europe Africa Oceania 
1987 0.00 17.84 4.66 4.20 7.13 38.90 5.52 16.39 1.77 1.74 
 (0.00) (3.16) (2.55) (1.43) (2.12) (2.43) (0.92) (0.27) (1.34) (1.29) 
2001 12.09 10.97 6.28 10.94 11.00 20.84 7.71 15.21 2.35 2.19 
 (2.77) (1.75) (1.74) (1.95) (2.50) (0.99) (1.08) (0.34) (3.70) (1.64) 
 
Table 7  Origin of Imports as Percentage of Total Imports 
(import intensity) 
(unit: %) 
Origin Import 
of 
China 
Japan Korea HK ASEAN 
Other 
Asia 
USA 
Other 
America 
Europe Africa Oceania 
1987 23.31 0.02 19.43 5.00 3.20 11.13 6.10 24.19 0.39 3.65 
 (2.52) (0.01) (9.92) (1.49) (1.71) (1.12) (0.81) (0.39) (0.34) (2.57) 
2001 17.57 9.60 3.87 9.53 16.67 10.76 4.40 19.45 1.02 2.58 
 (2.31) (3.38) (1.07) (1.39) (2.94) (0.78) (0.54) (0.40) (2.51) (1.82) 
Import 
of 
Korea 
China Japan HK ASEAN 
Other 
Asia 
USA 
Other 
America 
Europe Africa Oceania 
1987 0.00 33.29 0.97 6.99 8.46 21.36 5.19 13.34 0.87 4.02 
 (0.00) (3.59) (0.49) (2.08) (4.51) (2.15) (0.68) (0.22) (0.76) (2.81) 
2001 9.43 18.88 0.87 11.28 20.65 15.90 3.69 13.27 0.62 4.54 
 (1.92) (2.53) (0.25) (1.68) (3.72) (1.18) (0.46) (0.28) (1.55) (3.26) 
Source: Computation based on UN COMTRADE data. 
 
exports plus imports of a given industry.  The index takes a value 
between zero and one, with zero indicating that the country either exports or 
imports the good in question and one indicating that it simultaneously 
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exports and imports an equal amount of the same good, thus being engaged 
fully in intra- industry trade.  To calculate the index we use the trade data 
based on the SITC 4-digit classification (more than 1,000 industries), a 
classification disaggregate enough to give a meaningful measure of intra-
industry trade.  We then take a weighted average of the indices thus 
calculated, the weight being the trade share of each industry, to calculate the 
intra-industry trade index for the entire country and for a few select 
manufacturing sectors. 
The figures in the row with the heading of Total Trade on Table 8 report 
the intra-industry trade index of total global trade of China and Korea, 
respectively, for four different years.  We find that there was a definite 
upward trend in the index for the two countries’ global trade.  That is, 
between 1987 and 2001 the index increased from 0.25 to 0.38 for China and 
from 0.29 to 0.44 for Korea.  The figures for the sectoral index show, 
however, that this upward trend was by and large due to an increase in intra-
industry trade in SITC-6 in the case of China and SITC-5, -7 and -8 in the 
case of Korea.  This is not surprising, given that intra-industry trade is of 
greater importance in manufacturing industries, in which product 
differentiation and scale economies are more prevalent than in other sectors 
of the economy and given the convergence in the export structure of China to 
Korea reported above. 
The figures in the column under the heading of Bilateral Trade report the 
index for bilateral intra-industry trade between China and Korea.  It is clear 
that for China intra-industry trade with Korea is much less important, albeit 
on an upward trend, than its intra-industry trade with the rest of the world.  
The same is true for Korea. 
Product differentiation and scale economies are the standard explanations 
given for intra-industry trade.  There is, however, another reason why it may 
have expanded between China and Korea—that is, an increasing international 
fragmentation of production processes.  As noted earlier, studies have 
shown that many of China’s exports of high-technology products are from 
foreign-owned or joint venture firms that are in China to take advantage of its 
low-cost labor.  These firms are basically assembly operations that put  
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Table 8  Intra-Industry Trade Index 
 
  
China’s trade 
with world 
Korea’s trade 
with world 
Bilateral trade between 
China and Korea 
1987 0.25 0.29 0.00 
1991 0.35 0.34 0.10 
1996 0.34 0.44 0.28 
Total 
 
 
 2001 0.38 0.44 0.34 
1987 0.14 0.15 0.00 
1991 0.24 0.12 0.00 
1996 0.30 0.30 0.08 
Non- 
Manufacturing
2001 0.20 0.15 0.08 
Manufacturing      
1987 0.32 0.30 0.00 
1991 0.31 0.39 0.21 
1996 0.30 0.47 0.16 
 
SITC5 
2001 0.33 0.50 0.17 
1987 0.26 0.46 0.00 
1991 0.34 0.43 0.13 
1996 0.43 0.42 0.27 
 
SITC6 
2001 0.46 0.41 0.29 
1987 0.33 0.36 0.00 
1991 0.55 0.44 0.20 
1996 0.43 0.49 0.51 
 
SITC7 
2001 0.53 0.53 0.56 
1987 0.24 0.12 0.00 
1991 0.22 0.21 0.26 
1996 0.19 0.49 0.37 SITC8 
2001 0.19 0.57 0.33 
Note: Based on data provided by Korea. 
Source: Computation based on UN COMTRADE data. 
 
Table 9  Share of Parts Trade between China and Korea 
 
Export of Korea to China Export of China to Korea 
 
Share of Parts 
in the trade of 
SITC7&8 
Share of Parts 
in the total trade 
Share of Parts 
in the trade of 
SITC7&8 
Share of Parts 
in the total trade 
1991 12.9 2.9 10.0 0.6 
1996 24.5 7.3 24.3 7.0 
2001 41.4 14.9 26.5 12.8 
Source: UN COMTRADE data. 
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Table 10  Parts Trade in Major Manufactured Trade  
(2001, share of parts, %) 
 
SITC code Export of Korea 
 to China 
Export of China  
to Korea 
71. Power generating machinery and 
equipment 37.7 14.7 
72. Machinery specialized for particular 
industries 20.7 15.7 
73. Metalworking machinery  7.2 13.8 
74. General industrial machinery and 
equipment, nes, and parts of, nes  7.9   7.1 
75. Office machines and automatic data 
processing equipment 68.7 53.0 
76. Telecommunications, sound recording 
and reproducing equipment 96.0 79.1 
77. Electric machinery, apparatus and 
appliances, nes, and parts, nes 30.5 20.0 
78. Road vehicles 27.8 53.6 
79. Other transport equipment  5.4 12.9 
80.  Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles 12.2   1.5 
Source: UN COMTRADE data. 
 
together imported parts for sale outside of China, and since many of these 
imports and exports are in the same SITC groups they would be reported as 
intra-industry trade.  The figures on Table 9 show that between 1987 and 
2001 there indeed was an increase in parts trade between China and Korea, 
indicating an increasing fragmentation of production processes and an 
expansion of production networks.  Table 10 also shows significant parts- 
trade between the two countries, parts moving in both directions.  In SITC-
75 and -76 groups, especially, the parts-trade was significantly more than a 
half of the trade in those sectors.  Our research on the effect of Korean 
investment in China on bilateral trade, reported in section 4, also supports the 
hypothesis. 
As noted earlier, many Korean firms have invested in China to 
manufacture products for export markets.  Some of the exports are to Korea 
and others are to third-country markets, and what appears to be a competitive 
relationship between China and Korea is in fact a relationship in partnership 
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between the two countries to the extent that the exports from China are 
produced by Korean affiliates.  For instance, the loss of a market share in 
Japan and the United States by Korean exporters to Chinese exporters may be 
in part a displacement of exports from Korea by exports from Korean 
affiliates in China.  The following section attempts to shed some light on 
such relationship between Korean investment in China and the trade patterns 
of the two countries. 
 
4. KOREAN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: ITS MOTIVES AND 
EFFECT ON BILATERAL TRADE 
 
Given that Korea is one of the major investors in China and given the 
investment-trade nexus that is widely recognized in the literature, we need to 
ask how the Korean investment in China has affected the two countries’ trade 
patterns.  To answer this question we examine the results of two recent 
surveys on Korea’s overseas direct investment (ODI), one carried out by the 
Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET) and the other by 
the Korean Export-Import Bank (KEXIM).  The KIET survey, conducted by 
two KIET researchers, Ha and Hong (1998), was based on a sample of 615 
Korean companies (216 large firms and 399 small and medium-sized 
enterprises) and their 952 offshore affiliates.  It contains information on the 
motives for overseas investment, the patterns of sales and procurement, and 
other activities of offshore affiliates, as reported by their parent companies 
registered officially as overseas investors in 1996. 
The KEXIM survey was based on a smaller sample of 290 large offshore 
affiliates with an outstanding investment of at least US$10 million at the end 
of 1998.  Of these affiliates, 191 (66 percent) were the affiliates of the top 5 
chaebols and 29 (10 percent) the affiliates of the second-tier 25 largest 
chaebols.  Since small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are not 
included in the KEXIM survey, we expect to draw some inference about the 
investment in China by Korea’s SMEs and its effect on the trade patterns of 
the two countries by comparing the results of the two surveys.  
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4.1. Motives for Investing in China  
 
In the KIET survey the sample firms were asked to pick the two most 
important from a number of motives for investing overseas— natural 
resource or raw materials, low-cost labor, market access, high technology, 
and “others.” Out of 305 firms with investment in China, 179 (58.7 percent) 
reported low-cost labor and 66 firms (21.6 percent) market access as the most 
important motive for investing in China.  These motives are quite different 
from those for investing in North America and Europe, which, according to 
the survey, are market access, “others” and high technology in a descending 
order of importance (Kim and Lee, 2003).3) 
The KEXIM survey on the motives for Korea’s ODI shows that export 
expansion from Korea was chosen by 34.3 percent of the respondents as the 
most important reason for investing in China while low-cost labor was 
chosen by only 16.4 percent (Kim and Lee 2003).  This is significantly less 
than the 58.7 percent of the respondents in the KIET survey that reported 
low-cost labor as the most important motive for investing in China.  Given 
that the KEXIM survey covers only the affiliates of large firms whereas the 
KIET survey includes SMEs as well, we take the difference in the reported 
percentage as an indication that for the large firms the access to markets in 
China is the most important reason for investing in China whereas for the 
SMEs China’s low-cost labor is the most important one.4) 
According to the two surveys, the most important motive for ODI by 
labor-intensive textiles and apparel and the footwear and leather industries5) 
                                            
3) This difference in motives between ODI in China and that in North America and Europe 
may to a certain extent be due to the fact that China has SEZs and others do not. Some of 
the Korean ODI in China is likely to be in SEZs but with no access to China’s internal 
markets. Due to lack of data we are unable to verify this possibility. 
4) According to Tseng and Zebregs (2002), the market size is more important as a determinant 
of European and U.S. FDI in China than for FDI from Hong Kong and Taiwan. That is, the 
motive for investing in China by European and U.S. investors is similar to that of large 
Korean investors whereas the motive of Hong Kong and Taiwanese investors is similar to 
that of Korea’s SME investors. See also Graham and Wada, (2001). 
5) This survey results are consistent with the result of an econometric study that shows that 
investments from Hong Kong and Taiwan tend to use China to manufacture goods for 
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was, as to be expected, low-cost labor in host countries.  The textiles and 
apparel and the leather and footwear industries had been two of Korea’s 
major export industries until it began losing comparative advantage in labor-
intensive industries in the mid-1980s, owing in part to rapid wage increases 
in Korea.  The Korean firms in those industries had already established 
international marketing networks and thus could continue to utilize them in 
selling the products of their affiliates in China.  In the case of those 
industries it is reasonable to conclude that the exports from the Korean 
affiliates in China were displacing the exports of the same goods from Korea.  
Whether it has led to an increase in China-Korea bilateral trade in 
intermediate goods and “reverse imports” will be addressed later in the paper. 
Low-cost labor in China was an important factor in Korean firms’ decision to 
invest in capital-intensive heavy industries such as machinery and equipment, 
electronics and telecommunications equipment, and motors and freight 
(Table 11).  This apparent contradiction with the theory of comparative 
advantage (i.e., investment in capital-intensive industries in labor-abundant 
China) can be easily explained, however, once we recognize the increasingly 
widespread practice of intra-firm, inter-process production arrangements or 
“international fragmentation” in production processes (Jones, 2001).6) 
  Production processes in heavy industries involve, relative to light 
manufacturing industries, a large number of separable sub-processes with 
different requirements for technology and factor intensity — some sub-
processes requiring high-tech materials and component parts and others 
requiring an intensive use of low-cost labor.  A firm in such an industry can 
minimize the unit cost of output by producing high-tech components in the 
home country where there is a high technological capability and assembling 
components in China where there is an ample supply of low-cost labor.   
                                                                                                       
export to industrialized countries and also tend to be concentrated in labor-intensive 
industries that only require low-skill labor (Fung, Iizaka, and Parker 2002). 
6) Jones (2001) defines international fragmentation in the production process as a phenomenon 
that allows previously integrated production processes at one location to be separated into 
various component parts, some of them being “outsourced” to other countries. He adds that 
international fragmentation does not necessarily occur within a multinational corporation 
and can take place as arm’s-length transactions whereby the market is utilized between firms.  
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Table 11  KEXIM Survey on Motives for Korean investment in China 
(As of 1998; %) 
 
 Natural 
resource or 
Raw materials 
Low-cost 
labor 
Export 
Expansion 
High 
technology Others
Total     
(number of 
sample) 
Manufacturing 0.0 26.2 50.0 0.0 9.5 100 (42) 
Food and 
Beverage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 100 (3) 
Textiles and 
Apparel 0.0 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 (2) 
Footwear and 
Leather 0.0 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 (2) 
Petroleum and 
Chemicals 0.0 25.0 50.0 0.0 25.0 100 (4) 
Basic Metals 0.0 0.0 80.0 0.0 20.0 100 (5) 
Machine and 
Equipment      0.0 33.3 66.7 0.0 0.0 100 (6) 
Electronics 
and Telecomm 
equipment 
     0.0 18.8 62.5 0.0 18.8 100 (16) 
China 
Motors and 
Freight  0.0 33.3 66.7 0.0 0.0 100 (3) 
Note: The figures are the shares of the firms indicating the most important motive for investing abroad 
in total number of surveyed firms. 
 Source: KEXIM. 
 
Indeed, many Korean firms in heavy industries have made such production 
arrangements since the late 1980s by establishing assembly plants in China.  
International fragmentation thus makes it possible for a developing country 
to become a site for producing some parts of a previously wholly integrated 
process in a capital-intensive industry and acquire new skills and knowledge 
by producing them. 
The Korean affiliates in heavy industries in China may be serving as an 
export platform for their parent companies.  Even though, in that case, the 
affiliates’ exports from China are displacing exports from Korea, the 
international fragmentation of production processes has a positive effect on 
bilateral trade if parts and components are shipped from parent to affiliate 
firms or vice versa. 
 
4.2. Trade Patterns of Korean Affiliates in China 
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As discussed above, we are able to make some informed guesses about the 
effect on the trade patterns of Korean investment in China from the 
knowledge of its motives.  Here we try to find additional information on the 
investment-trade nexus by looking into the procurement and sales patterns of 
affiliates as reported in the KIET and KEXIM surveys.  This examination 
provides us, however, only with a first approximation of the investment-trade 
nexus since it does not take into account the indirect linkage effect of 
investment that may take place in other sectors in the economy. 
According to the KIET survey, 60.5 percent of the total procurement of 
intermediate goods and materials by Korean affiliates in China came from 
Korea, 31.3 percent from local suppliers in China, and 8.2 percent from third 
countries.  According to the KEIXM survey, the procurement pattern of 
large-firm affiliates differs from that of all affiliates: the former imported 
44.7 percent of intermediate goods and materials from Korea (78 percent of 
this share came directly from their parent companies or related affiliates).  
Local suppliers in China accounted for 39.2 percent of total procurement 
while third countries accounted for 16.1 percent.  In other words, Korea’s 
large-firm affiliates in China imported less from Korea, procured more 
locally and from third countries, implying that Korea’s SME-affiliates in 
China relied more heavily than their large-firm counterparts on imports from 
Korea and less from local and third-country sources.  This difference may 
be due to the network of SMEs being more localized inside Korea than that 
of large firms, which, we expect, is global in reach.  Another reason might 
be that, relative to SMEs, large firms are concentrated in capital-intensive 
industries, which are internationally more fragmented in production 
processes than labor-intensive industries in which ODI from SMEs is 
concentrated.   
The results of the KEXIM survey are consistent with the information 
obtained from the KIET survey.  That is, Korean affiliates in China 
imported a large share of their intermediate goods and materials from Korea, 
albeit not as much as that by those outside of Asia (including China).  They 
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generally procured more from local suppliers, creating substantial backward 
linkages within China.  These results lead to the conclusion that as far as 
procurement by affiliates is concerned Korean investment in China has had a 
positive effect on the China-Korea bilateral trade and has created extensive 
backward linkages, thus contributing to the economic integration of the two 
countries.     
Table 12 reports the procurement pattern of Korea’s large-firm affiliates in 
China.  In footwear and leather, basic metals, and machinery and equipment 
at least one half of intermediate goods and materials was imported from 
Korea.  In food and beverage, apparel, non-metallic minerals, and motors 
and freight a significant portion of inputs was supplied locally, a sign of 
strong backward linkages of investment in China by the affiliates of large 
Korean firms.  In textiles and basic metals at least a third of inputs was 
imported from third countries.    
For manufacturing as a whole the share of inputs imported from Korea was 
45.2 percent while the share of local procurement was 38.5 percent.  These 
high figures suggest that investment in China by Korea’s large-firm affiliates 
has had a positive effect on the bilateral trade.   
Table 13 reports the sales and exports of Korean affiliates as reported in 
the two surveys.  Korean affiliates in China exported 69.9 percent of their 
output to the rest of the world—27.9 percent to Korea and 42.0 percent to 
third countries (the top panel of the table).  In comparison, its large-firm 
affiliates exported 53.3 percent of their output to the rest of the world—24.5 
percent to Korea and 28.8 percent to third countries (the bottom panel of the 
table), indicating that Korea’s SME affiliates in China exported a much larger 
share of their output.  The share of local sales by the affiliates outside of 
China was much larger than that by the affiliates operating in China, 
suggesting that the latter performed largely as an export platform for Korean 
companies, especially for its SMEs.   
Table 14 reports the sales and exports of large-firm affiliates in China, as 
reported in the KEXIM survey.  For the entire manufacturing sector, local  
Table 12  KEXIM Survey on Sources of Procurement by Korea’s 
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Large-Firm Affiliates in China in Manufacturing 
    by Industry (As of 2000; % of total procurement) 
 
China 
Import 
 
Local 
Procurement Korea Third Countries 
Manufacturing   38.5  45.2 16.2 
   Food and Beverage   80.0  20.0    0.0 
   Textiles   29.5  32.2  38.3 
   Apparel   72.1  24.8    3.1 
   Footwear and Leather   29.9  68.5    1.5 
   Petroleum and Chemicals   44.2 27.9 27.8 
   Non-metallic Minerals 100.0   0.0    0.0 
   Basic Metals   17.0  49.8  33.1 
   Machinery and Equipment   10.0  67.4 22.6 
   Electronics and 
Telecommunication 
Equipment 
  41.8  45.1 13.1 
   Motors and Freight   55.6  44.4   0.0 
Data Source: KEXIM 
 
Table 13  Sales Destination of Offshore Affiliates of  
Korean Firms by Region 
 
KIET Survey (As of 1996) 
Export 
 Local Sales 
Korea Third Countries 
Total 
Asia 64.5 14.2 21.3 100 
China 30.2 27.9 42.0 100 
North America 93.9 3.6 2.5 100 
Europe 69.9 1.4 28.7 100 
Latin America 58.0 10.9 31.1 100 
KEXIM Survey (As of 2000) 
Export 
 Local Sales 
Korea Third Countries 
Total 
Asia 49.1 30.0 20.9 100 
China 46.7 24.5 28.8 100 
North America 83.5 5.5 11.0 100 
Europe 50.1 7.2 42.7 100 
Latin America 68.5 20.1 11.4 100 
Source: Ha and Hong (1998), KEXIM. 
Table 14  KEXIM Survey on Sales Destination of Korea’s Large-Firm 
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Affiliates in China in Manufacturing by Industry  
(As of 2000; % of total procurement) 
                                                             
China 
Export 
 
Local 
Sales Korea Third Countries 
Manufacturing  45.8 24.9 29.3 
   Food and Beverage  76.2   0.0 23.8 
   Textiles  36.0 38.3 25.7 
   Apparel  17.0 41.1 41.8 
   Footwear and Leather    0.2 20.3 79.5 
   Petroleum and Chemicals   75.1 11.4 13.6 
   Non-metallic Minerals  10.9 89.1  0.0 
   Basic Metals   97.8  0.0  2.2 
   Machinery and Equipment  100.0  0.0  0.0 
  Electronicsand Telecommunication 
Equipment   33.0 32.4 34.7 
   Motors and Freight   79.6 20.4  0.0 
Source: KEXIM 
 
sales in China accounted for 45.8 percent of total sales, reverse imports to 
Korea 24.9 percent, and exports to third countries 29.3 percent.  Reverse 
imports were especially large in non-metallic minerals (89.1 percent), 
followed by apparel (41.1 percent), textiles (38.3 percent), and electronics 
and telecommunication equipment (32.4 percent).  As noted earlier, offshore 
affiliates in most of those industries procured much of their intermedi 
products from their parent companies.  This pattern of procurement, 
combined with heavy reliance on reverse imports, suggests the importance of 
intra-firm trade for large-firm affiliates in those industries. 
For large-firm affiliates in China in the footwear and leather industry, 
third-country markets accounted for 79.5 percent of their total sales; for those 
in apparel 41.8 percent; and for those in electronics and telecommunication 
equipment 34.7 percent. 
Reverse imports resulting from overseas investment clearly add to the 
bilateral trade between home and host countries and reflect a changing 
comparative advantage between them.  One of the factors that motivated 
Korean firms to invest in China was the rapidly increasing gap in labor cost 
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between the two countries.  An increasing gap in labor cost between the two 
would have caused a contraction in labor-intensive industries in Korea and an 
expansion in the same in China even without the transfer of those industries 
to China through investment and would have led to Korea’s importing labor-
intensive products from China.  What overseas investment has done is to 
bring about a more rapid response of the international division of labor to 
changing comparative advantage and a greater expansion of bilateral trade 
between Korea and China than would have been otherwise (Ogawa and Lee, 
1996). 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Since it began the Four Modernization reforms in the late 1970s China has 
made rapid progress in economic development, shifting its comparative 
advantage from primary to manufactured goods.  We have shown that China 
has been converging to Korea in the export structure, its exports displacing 
many of Korean exports in third-country markets such as those in Japan and 
the United States.  This is likely to have had the effect of bringing about 
structural changes in the Korean economy more rapid than if China had not 
made such a rapid convergence.    
Rapid economic development in China has also led to a rapid increase in 
the China-Korea bilateral trade that began only in the late 1980s.  It has 
expanded more rapidly than the rate at which the both countries have 
increased their respective trade with the rest of the world—a sign of an 
increasing integration of the two economics. 
Korea has made direct investments in China, motivated by its cheap labor, 
expanding markets, and natural resources.  We have shown that the 
investments have had a positive effect on the two countries’ bilateral trade 
although some of them have led to the displacement of Korean exports in 
third country markets with exports from China.    
How China’s economic development will affect the Korean economy in 
the long run is obviously difficult to tell.  In the short or intermediate run 
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Korea will be confronted with the problems of structural adjustment as 
China’s economy develops, forcing Korea out of many of the sectors in 
which it currently has a comparative advantage.  Clearly, the challenge for 
Korea is to develop new areas of comparative advantage that will help it 
achieve sustained economic growth. 
The Korean government has selected a number of industries such as 
digital TV and next-generation mobile phones as the new core industries that 
will hopefully turn into leading sectors of economic growth (Chun, 2003).  
It is not clear, however, what specific measures the government can provide 
to promote those industries.  Industrial policies such as those used to 
promote the heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s will be, we suspect, 
no longer appropriate for the Korean economy, which has become too big 
and too complex for such policies to be effective.  Barring such policies, the 
government’s role will probably be limited to providing public goods and 
social infrastructure, especially to promote high-value service industries, and 
keeping the capital and labor markets flexible and efficient.   
The history of world economic primacy shows that the economies that 
once held the position of economic primacy subsequently declined for 
reasons that were generally unique to each case.  In the case of Venice, for 
example, which held a world commercial leadership in 1550 but declined to 
insignificance some years before 1700, the factors that led to its decline 
included the competition from Portugal in spices, the British in woolens, and 
the Dutch and British in shipping; the rigid attitude of guilds and workers; 
and a leveling off of productivity (Kindleberger, 1996, p.65).  Spain and the 
Low Countries, whose economic primacy followed that of Venice, also had a 
similar fate but for reasons of their own.  Although what brought about the 
fall from the position of world economic primacy differed from case to case 
there appears to have been one factor common to all.  And that is, in all 
those economies rigidity eventually took over the vitality and flexibility that 
they once had had (ibid., p.36).  It may have been some uncontrollable 
external factors that triggered the downfall, but it was the inability to adapt to 
and successfully deal with the external challenges that ultimately brought that 
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about.  And that is a lesson that Korea must learn from the history of world 
economic primacy: if its economic growth ever falters it will be not because 
of rapid economic development in China, which is anyway beyond Korea’s 
control, but because of the loss of vitality and flexibility in its economic 
system. 
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